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SYMPOSIUM ON LAWMAKING
of legal sanctions. The wider the range of meaning, the wider the
scope of judicial legisputations, and, accordingly, the greater the uncertainty. The second is the injustice of haste, oversight and undersight resulting from the cumbersomeness and complexity of the legislative mechanism-injustice to those who, because of these infirmities,
would be denied equality and fairness of treatment under law. The
choice between these two injustices is clearly not between black and
white. As is true of much of the law, it is between a sligltly lighter
and a slightly darker shade of gray. But the blurred lines become
somewhat less blurred when it is realized that at stake is not certainty
per se, but the substitution of one kind of certainty for another. With
the sacrifice of the certainty of literalness of language there is no need
necessarily to assume the absence of the certainty of principle behind
such language.
To choose the broader range of legisputations is not to advocate
an ignoring of legislative goals. To the contrary, it means clarifying
them and making explicit what is implicit in them. If it means smoothing their rough edges; if it means reconciling them; if it means extending or limiting them when tested by the unforseen consequences of the
concrete case, it does not necessarily mean the substitution of judicial
for legislative policy. Clarification, refinement, and harmonization may
be the added increments, but it is the clarification, refinement, and
harmonization of legislative policy in order to make that policy as rational as possible, and thereby to maximize its effectiveness. In so doing, the approach to legislative meaning is not through the narrow lens
of the grammarian, but through the broader vision of the ethical philosopher, who, though confronted with the specific of a moral command,
cannot begin to discern what it really should import without endeavoring
somehow to fit it into the value scheme as a whole.

THE ESSENTIAL FOCUS OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
JOSEPH P.

WITHERSPOONt

Professor Dickerson, as chairman of the 1960 AALS Round Table
on Legislation, has already indicated the reasons for selecting the topic
for discussion: "Judicial Lawmaking in Relation to Statutes." This
subject, it may be added, permits us to turn for the first time in three
t Professor of Law, University of Texas.

INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
decades of the Round Table institution to the central problem concerning
judicial assignment of statutory meaning.' This problem concerns the
place of judicial lawmaking in administration of statutes. A similar
problem is presented with respect to lawmaking by administrative agencies in admiistration of statutes. The latter problem encompasses a
wider vista because of the fact that administrative agency lawmaking may
occur in adjudicative, legislative, or executive forms of administrative
action. The topic for discussion assumes that it may be necessary to
distinguish between judicial lawmaking by statutory analogy and judicial
interpretation in relation to statutes. The thesis of this paper raises
doubts about the validity of this distinction and seeks to establish what
the essential focus of statutory interpretation must be in modern democratic political society.
1. The Round Tables of the Thirties were enchanted with the fresh, sweet scent
of new legal developments achieved dramatically through the regulatory statutes of the
New Deal. The first Round Table specifically instituted to consider problems concerning
legislation met in 1932. ASSOCIATION OF AMNERICAN LAW SCHOOLS HANDBOOK 129 (1932).
Its topic related to use of statutory materials in the law school curriculum. In 1934 Dean
Landis delivered a paper on "The Implications of Modern Legislation to Law Teaching"
to a session of the Associating meeting. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS
HANDBOOK 122 (1934). The 1935 and 1936 Legislation Round Tables considered the
proper scope of legal training with respect to legislation. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS HANDBOOK 166 (1935), 224 (1936). The 1936 Comparative Law Round
Table included a paper on modern trends in interpretation. ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN
LAW SCHOOLS HANDBOOK 222 (1936). In 1939 the Jurisprudence and Legal History
Round Table devoted part of its session to interpretation of statutes in the sixteenth

century. The lively discussion of statutory interpretation taking place in legal periodicals
during the thirties did not reach the Round Tables of the same period.
The Legislation Round Tables of the Forties and Fifties dealt almost exclusively
with important problems concerning the drafting of statutes, the teaching of the legislation course, and the operations of congressional government. Only one of seven programs
was directed toward investigation of the problem of assignment of statutory meaning.

The subject of this program was "The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation
of Statutes: Where Are We Going? Where Should We Go?" ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS PROCEEDINGS 187-8 (1953). Professor Henry M. Hart, who served as
Chairman of the Round Table, prepared a "tentative restatement of the law" relative

to use of legislative history to serve as a basis for discussion. See HART AND SACKS,
THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW

1284-6 (tentative ed. 1958).

This restatement proceeded upon the assumption that

statutory interpretation was essentially to be distinguished from modes of dealing with
a statute that have been characterized as judicial lawmaking including, among others,
use of a statute as a principle for deciding a case (the technique of statutory analogy).
The speaker, as a discussant in that Round Table, took the position that the prudential
character of legal process had implications for interpretative thesis that required
greater recognition than had usually been given them. It was suggested that the interpreter, of a statute must often engage properly in a lawmaking process and that an
adequate thesis of statutory interpretation must respond "to the underlying exigencies
of the lawmaking process, whether engaged in by a legislator, administrator, or judge,
and . . . make these three arms of government coadjutors in the prudential process of
legislative choice and its subsequent interpretative elaboration . . ." Witherspoon, The

Use of Legislative History ini the Interpretation of Statutes: Where Should We Go? 4-5
(mimeographed, 1953, on file in the University of Texas School of Law Library.
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British and American legal scholars have engaged in an extensive
discussion of our problem during the past sixty years. This discussion
roughly divides into three areas. The first of these consists of scholars
who assert that assignment of statutory meaning is properly to be done
by a process according to discretion. One may call this process "interpretation," but it is necessary to see, these scholars assert, that the process is essentially one of discretion-of freedom to choose the statutory
meaning desired and therefore a freedom throughout to make the law
administered. This discretion or freedom to make law stems from the
fact, they assert, that there is no valid concept of legislative intention or
legislative purpose. Even if it may be conceded that these concepts have
validity and respond to elements of reality in legislative process, the
data of legislative intention or purpose behind a particular statute are
not responsive to the mass of meaning-assignment problems encountered by the courts. Moreover, there are no other genuine standards or
principles for assig-nment of statutory meaning. The canons and
maxims of traditional interpretation doctrine must be considered as devoid of genuine directive content and mere facades for bolstering a
judicial judgment already reached by independent means. Likewise,
neither the concept of justice nor received notions of justice provide any
guidance of an objective nature. Thus, the court is essentially engaged
throughout the process of meaning-assignment in making law. The
most articulate statement of this position, the "high road" of administrative discretion, was made by the late Professor Max Radin.2
A second group of scholars has suggested narrowing the area of
judicial lawmaking just described. Recognizing with adherents to the
"high road" that much of traditional interpretation doctrine is not now
genuinely used by courts in determining statutory meaning, some of
these scholars propose converting the so-called rules of this traditional
doctrine into genuine and binding rules of law.' This proposed conversion is designed to cause the rules affected really to operate as the
2. Radin, Statutory Interpretation,43 HARv. L. REv. 863 (1930). Other scholars
who have more or less shared this position, sometimes with significant innovations, are
Mr. Ernest Bruncken, Professor Corry, and Dean Levi. See, Bruncken, Interpretation
of Written Law, 25 YALE L.J. 129 (1915) ; Corry, Administrative Law and the Interpretation of Statutes, 1 U. TORONTO L.J. 286 (1936) and The Use of Legislative History
in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 CAN. B. REv. 624 (1954) ; and Levi, An Introduction
to Legal Reasoning, 15 U. Cm. L. REv. 501 (1948). For an analysis of the "high road"
position see Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning:
"The High, Road," 35 TEXAs L. REv. 63 (1956).
3. Silving, A Plea for a Law of Interpretation, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 499 (1950);Johnstone, Evaluation of the Rules of Statutory Interpretation,3 KAN. L. REv. 1 (1954);:
ef. Jackson, The Meaning of Statutes-What Congress Says or What the Court Says,

34 A.B.A.J. 535 (1948).

" 426

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

basis or source of the meaning that is assigned to statutes. Under this
proposal the meaning assigned to statutes is to be drawn principally, not
from the statutes, but from rules for assigning meaning to them. Other
scholars in this group merely appear to be proposing a genuine use of
the traditional rules of interpretation by courts but without binding them
to apply any one of these rules, where otherwise applicable, if indicia
of purpose render it inappropriate to do so.' A contribution of Professor H. L. A. Hart on this matter5 has been viewed by some as positing a "hard core" of meaning for statutory terms that must control
their interpretation irrespective of the context or the purposes behind
their use.6 The suggestions of these scholars perhaps justifies labelling
their position as the "low road" of administrative discretion.' Nevertheless, these scholars as a whole clearly agreed for the same reasons
with "high road" adherents that much judicial administration of statutes
is inevitably judicial lawmaking rather than interpretation and that it
must be done by a process of judgment according to discretion.
Most scholars, however, take what may be called a "middle road"
position on the problem of how statutory meaning is to be assigned.'
Most of these scholars affirm what the other groups deny-that the
legislative purpose concept is valid because responsive to realities in
legislative process. Most of them also affirm that the central task in
assigning meaning is to discover and effectuate relevant legislative purposes of a given statute.9 In the main these scholars divide the task
of administering statutes into two parts: one of these is to be performed by a process of judgment according to law and the other
part by a process of judgment according to discretion. So far as courts
are concerned, the administration of statutes is principally to be performed by a process according to law. This latter process itself is
4. Williams, Language and the Law, 61 L.Q. REv. (pts. I-IV) 71, 179, 293, 384
(1945); (pt. V) 62 L.Q. REv. 387 (1946).
5. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARv. L. R.Ev. 593

at 606-15 (1958).

6. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law--A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARv.
L. REv. 630 at 661-9 (1958).
7. Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: 'The
Low Road I, II,' 38 TEXAs L. REv. 392, 572 (1960).
8. The scholars in question include Dean Pound and the late Professor De
Sloovere, the work of whom constitutes a sub-position within the overall position.
9. The scholars in question include the late Professor Freund, Dean Landis, and
Professors Fuller, Hart, Sacks, Horack, Jones, Nutting, Llewellyn, Cohen, Friedmann,

Lenhoff, Newman, Surrey, Phelps, and Tunks. The outstanding exception is the
late Mr. Charles P. Curtis, Jr. The pertinent works of these authors and of those
referred to in note 8 supra are listed in Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to
Determine Statutory Meaning: "The High Road" 35 TEXAs L. Rv.63 at 71-3. To this
listing should be added the recent work of Professors Hart and Sacks cited in note 1
supra and of Professor Fuller cited in note 6 supra.
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divided into two parts: one is the assignment of -statutory meaning by
the legal technique of interpretation and the other is the making of law
by the technique of statutory analogy. Neither of these functions properly considered, it is said, involves a process of discretion. Each is
a process of judgment according to law, according to legal methods or
techniques. Nevertheless, there is a difference in the binding effect
upon the court of these two functions and their concomitant techniques.
The court is not free to assign or not to assign meaning to a statute.
It must assign meaning, if possible to do so, and it must assign this
meaning by a process called interpretation. If certain meaning is indicated for a particular statute in light of the purposes underlying its
explicit rules, the court is bound to assign that meaning and to apply
the statute to cases comprehended by that meaning. There is a certain
"field of operation" for the statute in light of its explicit rules beyond
which the statute does not extend. Within that field, however, the
court is bound to hue to the line circumscribed by the meaning that may
appropriately be poured into the forms of the statute by interpretation.
It is true that the "middle road" scholars agree that the literalist elements of traditional interpretation doctrine are neither helpful nor justifiable for assigning meaning to statutes. It is also true that most of
these scholars recognize that various administrative factors or standards
must be given effect by courts in performing the function of interpretation. Despite their recognition of this vital role for judicial use of
administrative standards in assigning statutory meaning, these scholars
have insisted that the judicial process relative to statutes here in question remains one of "interpretation" rather than becoming one of
"lawmaking."
Turning to the second mode for administering statutes according
to law, the technique of statutory analogy, we find "middle road"
scholars taking the position that this mode is not mandatory upon the
courts. Contrary to the technique of interpretation, the technique of
statutory analogy is viewed as part and parcel of the equipment of a
court operating in its native habitat of the common law. Thus, if a
statute does not cover a controversy before the court as determined
through application of the technique of interpretation to it, the court
may, but need not, apply that statute to that controversy if it is otherwise logically relevant. The binding effect of statutory law upon a
court coincides, therefore, with "the field of the statute" as determined
by interpretation. Outside this "field" the court may, if it decides to
do so, turn to common law principles as a source for decision rather
than utilize the statutory analogy. The determination to utilize the
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one or the other source for decision is to be reached by means of the
appropriate techniques of common law decisional process. The freedom
to use or not to use a statute posited by the technique of statutory
analogy was first supported in this century in this country by Dean
Pound."
His notion of this technique was substantially adopted later
by Dean Landis," Professors Hart and Sacks, 12 and other scholars.
Beyond the two techniques of decision according to law for administration of statutes just mentioned, "middle road" scholars speak
of a process of decision according to discretion. Some of them, such
as Dean Pound, tally this process with a step of judicial decision termed
"application" of the law as contrasted with the so-called prior steps of
"finding" and "developing" or "elaborating" the law.'
The problem
of judicial application and, therefore, of discretion, is said to arise in
its typical form with respect to statutory standards. The concepts of
the "fair and the equitable," "reasonable," and "just" present, it is
said, a problem of application rather than elaboration. Nevertheless,
it is recognized that judicial application of the narrower concepts of
rules may present the same problem involved in administration of standards if judgment relative to the application to be made by the court is
not foreclosed as a result of the appropriate rule having been found and
elaborated. These scholars also assert that the various forms for administration of statutes by administrative agencies (legislative rulemaking, initial licensing, contracting, mediating, inspecting, etc.) appropriately involve, so far as elaboration and application of a statute
is concerned, a process of judgment according to discretion rather than
according to law. This paper will not examine the validity of the assumptions underlying this attempted distinction in techniques or methods
of decision. It must be said, however, that an adequate thesis concerning statutory interpretation must examine these assumptions and resolve the meaning-assignment problems necessarily presented by judicial
application and administrative agency administration of statutory law.
The position to be presented here on what may be called the problematic of statutory meaning substantially accords with the position of
10. Pound, Common Law and Legislation., 21 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1908); The
Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 641 at 647-8 (1923); III JURISPRUDENCE
654-63 (1959).
11. Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law, in HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 213 (1934).
12. HART AND SACKS, op. cit. s pra note 1 at 107-8, 436-7, 476, 486-9, 798-808.
13. Pound, The Theoriv of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REV. 940 at 950-2 (1923)
II JURISPRUDENCE 353-74 (1959); IV JURISPRUDENcE 10-1, 24-5 (1959); JusTICE AcCORDING TO LAW 42-3 (1951); LAw AND MORALS 58-61 (1924); AN INTRODUcTION TO
THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 52-65 (Rev. ed. 1954). Also see, HART AND SACKS, op. Cit.
supra note 1 at 160-79.
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those "middle road" scholars who affirm the validity of the legislative
purpose concept and who state that the central task in assigning statutory
meaning is to discover and effectuate legislative purposes. Nevertheless, the proposition will be supported that the position as currently
stated by its proponents, with the exception of Professor Fuller, suffers
from severe, if not fatal, defects. The remainder of this paper will
be devoted to outlining a part of what may be a more valid solution of
the problematic of statutory meaning and the reasons for considering
it to be a more valid solution. In view of the limited topic of the
Round Table this presentation will not cover the important related problems of judicial review of administrative action and of lawmaking by
administrative agencies.
We may begin most appropriately with the proposition that the
currently understood dichotomy between judicial interpretation and
judicial lawmaking by statutory analogy must be rejected. One reason has been mentioned by Professor Dickerson. This is the difficulty
-one could well say impossibility-of distinguishing between the judicial creativity encompassed under the aegis of interpretation, on the one
hand, and the judicial creativity we find in areas of explicit judicial lawmaking, on the other, e.g., in the use of statutory analogy. This reason
for rejection is one of procedural integrity-of calling a spade a spade,
of recognizing the fictitious character of any monolithic view of interpretation. There is, however, a more fundamental reason for rejecting the dichotomy. Judicial lawmaking in relation to statutes has been
viewed as having at least two aspects. One form has been regarded by
some as an improper departure from the technique of interpretation.
Usually, however, one may reasonably reply that this so-called judicial
lawmaking either is or is not a proper determination and use of legislative purpose as the basis for assigning statutory meaning. It is this
kind of reply Professor Cohen has in mind when he felicitously distinguishes between nonusurpatory and usurpatory judicial lawmaking
and when he insists the former, properly considered, is not judicial lawmaking at all. The other form of judicial lawmaking, that involving
use of statutory analogy, has already been mentioned. It has been regarded as a freedom to use or not to use a statute with regard to a
situation before the court that interpretation indicates is not "covered"
by the statute. The more fundamental reason for rejecting the current
dichotomy between statutory interpretation and statutory analogy, it is
suggested here, is that this distinction cannot be justified and prevents
courts from achieving the essential focus of statutory interpretation.
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The support given to the technique of statutory analogy by scholars
such as Dean Pound, Dean Landis, Professors Hart and Sacks, and others
is obviously pursuant to a view moving in the right direction. The
question is whether it sufficiently accords to statutes the status they
should be given in the overall regime of law. It is the position of the
speaker that this view fails to accord to statutes their rightful statusindeed commits statute law to a second-class citizenship in the city of
law. Dean Landis has said that the central question concerns the place
"that statutes are to occupy in the ultimate processes of lawmaking by
judges."14 He has in mind the realm of common law and the possible
use of "statutes as a source of common law" by judges.1" This question
concerning judicial lawmaking must be rephrased to indicate that it
arises in the realm, not of common law, but of statute law. Obviously
this is the way the question must be phrased with regard to administrative agencies. There is no justification for phrasing it differently with
regard to courts. In talking about judicial lawmaking in the realm
of common law by use of statute law, advocates of the technique of
statutory analogy have already begged the essential issue concerning the
proper role of courts in administration of statutes. They have assumed
that all judicial lawmaking, including that done with reference to statutes,
involves the same basic considerations and the same commitments.
We now turn to the fundamental error that pervades the whole of
the attempted dichotomy between statutory interpretation and statutory
analogy and therefore prevents any possibility of compromise in support
of it. It is the error of legal positivism, because the attempted dichotomy
of decisional techniques assumes law to be bound up wholly in the
notion of the legal rule. Law is viewed as beginning and ending with
legal rules and the hold of a particular statute law upon a court is conceived as beginning and ending with the particular precepts through
which it is expressed by the legislature. Even when scholars like Dean
Landis and Professors Hart and Sacks properly assert the necessity for
resort to legislative purposes in statutory administration, they remain
bound to the foundations of legal positivism with Bentham and Austin
and Dean Pound. They remain so bound by virtue of extending the
mandatory administration of statutes only to administration of express
statutory rules and their necessary implications. They thus view the
realm of statutory law as circumscribed by the "linguistic possibilities"
of express statutory rules.' 6 The cleavage they wreak between manda14. Landis, op. cit. supra note 11 at 214.
15. Id. at 219.
16. HART AND SACKS, op. cit. supra note 1 at 1220-2.
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tory elaboration of legislative purposes and discretionary elaboration of
those same purposes is as fundamental an error as that committed by
legal positivists in attempting to effect a cleavage between law and morality, purpose and rule, fact and value. The advocates of the technique of statutory analogy have been moved to their advocacy in order,
most properly, to escape the confines of current notions relative to the
technique of statutory interpretation. For inherent in these current
notions of interpretation, whether of the intention or purpose variety,
is a commitment to a pseudo-definitive scope of application-the socalled "statutory field"-beyond which the statute does not constitute
law binding the court. The advocates of statutory analogy properly
see that such a view of statutes represents a waste of "legal gold," a

veritable misuse of an institutional product, particularly in modern
political societies. They deeply desire to move courts to make greater
use of statutes. They have faced, however, the unenviable task of
justifying advocacy at one and the same time of a "freedom from" and
a "freedom for" utilization of the same statutory purposes in the socalled field not covered by the statute. They have not made a persuasive
case for greater utilization of statutes in judicial administration. Courts
generally continue to express the view of statutes as belonging to an
area of law whose chief characteristic is to be in the form of definitive,
finished, express rules. Although the actual results courts reach in
administering statutes indicates the fictional character of this view and
of the technique of interpretation that supports it, practice in adjudication has made no greater doctrinal accommodation than legal theorists
have between the notion of what statutes are and a greater utilization
of them. Those who have advocated greater use of statutes through
employment of statutory analogy should have questioned whether a
technique of statutory interpretation was valid that made necessary a
resort to statutory analogy in order to avoid the institutional waste
in question.
It is not possible here to explore and expound the nature and repercussions of the fundamental error of legal positivism as it has impinged upon the theory of judicial and administrative decision making.
It will be sufficient for our purposes simply to state that the error is
two-fold. On the one hand the exaltation of the legal rule as the ultimate tool of law administration has been an abortive and unjustifiable
attempt to separate a world of law from a world of non-law. On the
other hand, the attempt to separate as far as possible a human and
therefore essentially purposive instrument, the law, from its purposes,
has hobbled our ability and desire to examine the reality and structure
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of human decision-making and to fashion it more perfectly. The debilitating effect of the positivist separation is more than procedural,
however, as some have thought. More fundamentally, it has dulled
our intellectual appetite for the exciting adventure involved in exploring
the processes, matter, and limits of adequate judgments concerning the
human values with which law must be concerned. The positivist error
is essentially a Victorian pushing under the rug of the problem of human
evaluation. In the realm of traditional law we are overcoming and in
the realm of constitutional law we have in the main avoided this fundamental error of legal positivism. In the realm of statutory law both
theory and practice are still laboring under the burden of this error.
We may, however, elaborate an important and a justifiable function for the operation of the explicit rules of statutory law without
committing courts in administering statutes solely or even chiefly to
"administering rules." In order to achieve a satisfactory elaboration
of this function, two considerations are essential. One relates to the
role of legislative purposes in the administration of statutory rules.
The other concerns the ultimate or basic tool for administration of
statutes by courts. This is the statutory principle, that ineffable product of the interplay in judicial administration between legislative purposes, statutory rules, and administrative factors. No fruitful evaluation of the role of legislative purposes and of the ultimate tool in statutory administration by courts is possible unless it is made in light
of the function courts perform in the overall framework of legal institutions in modern political society. This function, by common agreement, is adjudicative settlement of justiciable controversies by a process
of judgment directed toward the achievement of "justice according to
law." To this goal some would add: "and, when appropriate, justice
according to discretion." One may raise important questions concerning the form and limits of adjudication as well as the distinction between judgment according to law and judgment according to discretion.
Whatever be the proper answer to these questions, however, they cannot
draw into serious question the basic fact that courts through adjudication make and are expected to make an essential contribution to the
content of the on-going law they administer. This essential contribution to content has been variously described as resulting from "the
collaborative articulation of shared purposes" (Professor Fuller),"
the "reasoned elaboration of the purposes underlying legal arrangements
(Professors Hart and Sacks)," "the Grand Style of the Common Law
17. Fuller, Hunan Purpose and Natural Law, 3 NATURAL L.F. 68, 74 (1958).
18. HART AND SACKS, 6p. cit. supra note 1 at 162, 164-5.
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S.a way of thought and work . . . [and a] future-directed quest for
ever better formulations for guidance" (Professor Llewellyn),' 9 or
simply "the process of evolving concepts" (Dean Green).2° The point
is not so much that the legislature does not or cannot make this contribution to content, but that courts inevitably make an essential contribution
to the content of the law they administer. As adjudicative administration of law proceeds from case to case, there gradually emerges as the
growing basis for decision a decisional principle which increasingly
subordinates the prior applications of a relevant rule or even of several
related rules. This decisional principle is at once a reflection of those
prior applications, the purposes or ends underlying those applications,
and administrative factors such as considerations of justice, practicability,
coherence, necessity, and logic. One may most appropriately say that
one essential function of the court in our legal institutional framework
is to contribute adjudicative decisional principles to the content of the
law by the proper employment of existing rules, underlying and relevant
purposes, and administrative considerations.
One of the vehicles by which the judicial contribution to statutory
content is effectuated is the range or hierarchy of legislative purposes
underlying statutory law. The great bulk of "middle road" scholars
have always insisted that relevant legislative purposes must be carefully
regarded in administration of statutes. In light of the rather universal legislative, administrative, and judicial practices obtaining today in
this country concerning the operation of legislative purposes the war
concerning the role of legislative purposes in administration has been
won by these scholars. The question is no longer whether these purposes will be regarded in administration of statutes, but rather how
they will be utilized. It is the author's position that a new, broadergauged, and longer-ranged concept of legislative purpose must be given
effect in statutory administration. Relevant legislative purposes include far more than immediate historical purposes at work in the legislative process that produces a particular statute. These are the purposes
that have been the main focus of "middle road" scholars. These purposes are important, but they are frequently less important than other
legislative purposes properly bearing on administration of a particular
statute. Relevant legislative purposes also include those at work in two
or more fields because of the necessity for these fields to maintain a
rational connection between each other. Looking in the opposite direction we may see that legislative purposes developed subsequently to the
19.
20.

LLEWELLYN, THE CoimoN LAW TRADITION' 36, 38 (1960).
GREEN, TORT LAW: PUBLIC LAW IN DISGUISE II 257, 268

(1960).
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enactment of a statute must also have their impact on the administration
of that statute. This expression of purpose may occur through legislative oversight of judicial and administrative action or it may occur
through enactment of new statutes in the field of law to which the
first particular statute belongs or in one of several related fields. The
new hypothesis of legislative purpose here suggested greatly increases
the useful range of express statutory precepts. It does this by way of
requiring the court to shape the content it gives to express rules in light
of a more complex purposive framework. The new hypothesis also
realigns administration of statutes with the integral, unitary, on-going
reality of legislative lawmaking. We disregard this reality when we
view relevant legislative purposes as confined to those immediately occasioning a given statute.
The new hypothesis of legislative purpose suggested is not only -a
development of first priority in the immediate future. It also will necessitate great changes in administrative techniques and scholarly research.
We have long been accustomed to studying judicial process in administration of common law with a view to grasping prudential factors and
purposes "across-the-board" in various common-law fields irrespective
of whether the decision making is taking place at the same time or with
respect to closely related matters. We have in view by such comparison
the expectation that the way decisions are being reached in one field at
one time may be suggestive of better decision-making in other fields at
other times. Little similar research, however, has been done upon the
decisional process utilized by legislators in making statutes. We have
not attempted to focus upon prudential factors and purposes at work in
legislative process "across-the-board" in various fields and how these are
brought to bear upon decisions required to be made in legislative prudential process. Nor have we attempted to carry such analysis over into
the area of statutory administration with a view to making these factors
and purposes operative in assignment of meaning to statutes.
If, as the author believes, judicial resort to legislative purposes other
than those occasioning passage of a statute is appropriate under normal
operating conditions, the very foundations of modem administrative
theory are shaken. These foundations posit an essential difference between judge-made law administration and statutory law administration.
These foundations, however, are seriously weakened, if not destroyed,
under the hypothesis just suggested since in that event the court in administration of statutes legitimately has a creative role as great and
probably greater than the creative role traditionally exercised in the making and administration of common law. Under this hypothesis the very
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concept of interpretation takes on dimensions not overtly conceded in the
last and present centuries. Also the judicial function relative to statutes
becomes more closely aligned with that of the legislature without, however, losing its essential character. Many of the deficiencies and difficulties of present interpretative theses, which the legislative purpose variety does not avoid, become less insoluble. The particular historical purpose and meaning of a statutory precept, while important, may be relegated to a more modest role under some circumstances. Indeed, the
statute becomes more important than the precepts it includes and the
statutory fabric of which the statute is a part becomes the vital factor
in assignment of meaning to it. The statute becomes a dynamism capable of responding to the changes in conditions inevitably presented during the administration of that statute. Yet administration is not freed
from its duty of fidelity to legislative process-it must be, indeed, more
faithful to that process under the new hypothesis because it must be
faithful to more of that process.
Nevertheless, the fullest and most adequate concept of legislative
purposes will not suffice, without more, to make the statute an effective
legal instrument. An essential component in any area of law administration, whether of traditional, constitutional, or statutory law, is the legal
principle or formula that mediates between purposes relevant to the general rule and the rule itself. Wholly apart from differences in the way
a legal principle comes into being in each of these areas of law administration, it is clear that law cannot live without effect being given to legal
principles or formulas for administering its general rules. It can only
die. This is as true of statutory law as any other form of law.
The author thus is of the view that the central aim in administration
of a statute is to discover or formulate, as well as give effect to, principles or formulas for elaborating the purposes bearing upon the statute
and for administering its precepts. It is important to see that relevant
legislative purposes other than historical purposes of a particular statute
must infuse administration of that statute from the outset. It is even
more important, however, to recognize what function is to be performed
by legislative purposes. This is to serve, along with statutory precepts,
as a guide for discovery or formulation of statutory principles. The statutory precept is conceived from the weakness of the legislative position,
of being removed from the furnace of individual cases that have to be
decided. So conceived by the legislature the statutory precept is partial,
inadequate, and basically in need of development of its underlying or internal integrity. This integrity is its principle, at bottom a product of
administration in light of legislative and administrative standards. The
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contribution of the legislature and the court to the formulation of statutory principles will vary from statute to statute. In all cases, however,
the contribution of the court will be a very considerable one. Its contribution will be made largely pursuant to administrative standards that are
either concerned with discovery and processing of legislative purposes or
with adding new considerations relevant to just and wise administration.
Once the statutory principle is discovered or formulated, the court
is as bound to preserve and enhance that principle as it was in first instance to discover or formulate it. There is never a time when the court
may turn its back on the statute and say it is free to stop carrying its
statutory principles and purposes forward to applications indicated by
usual administrative considerations and instead resort to principles of
traditional law (or to a claim of "no applicable law"). The contention
that a court is free to do this is precisely the central error of "middle
road" scholars like Dean Pound, Dean Landis, and Professors Hart and
Sacks. The court is an agency of administration relative to a statute
even when engaged in subordinate lawmaking by use of that statute. This
means it has the duty of fidelity to statutory principles and legislative
purposes provided for directing formation and administration of those
principles. Of course, we have never recognized that administrative
agencies may dispense with the duty of fidelity to these principles and
purposes. No more can we justify any alternative to this duty of fidelity
in the case of a court. This is the necessary result of the court's relation
to the legislature in democratic political society. When the court administers a statute and whether or not it engages in subordinate lawmaking by use of that statute, it is an administrator of law. If it resorts to
common law, as it frequently will, it only does so in its role as administrator of the statute and in subordination to the central purposes
and principles of the statute.
Let us examine more closely the suggested hypothesis for statutory
administration by courts. The legislature always provides certain express provisions in a statute, and, in a more or less discernible way, legislative purposes that bear upon administration of those provisions. Sometimes the legislature may go further and provide in fairly definitive form
statutory principles that are to be given effect in administration of statutory precepts and that are to mediate between those precepts and relevant
legislative purposes. More generally the legislature will not provide definitive statutory principles because they presently cannot be provided. When
this occurs, statutory precepts represent inchoate legislative guides for
courts to use in developing statutory principles in light of relevant legislative purposes. These precepts serve to give an initial form and direc-
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tion to administration while the latter drives, as it inevitably must, toward development of statutory principles.
Thus, in the early period of judicial administration of a statute, express statutory precepts more or less "comprehend" the cases to which
the statute is to be applied. This simply means that these precepts are
directive of the obvious cases for inclusion and exclusion in light of relevant legislative purposes. Yet even from the beginning it is only relatively true that express statutory precepts comprehend the cases to which
the statute is applied. Moreover, as administration of the statute becomes farther removed from its creation, these precepts become less and
less determinative of the results in administration. This is true because
application of the statute involves consideration of a variety of possible
applications. Resolution of these problems requires resort to both legislative purposes and various administrative considerations. Eventually
cases are presented to which express provisions, viewed inaccurately as
determinate, definitive rules or directions, cannot "apply." On the other
hand, the underlying mode of past application does call for the statute to
be applied to the cases in question if legislative purposes are to be subserved presently as in the past and if analogous or similar cases are to be
treated similarly. The statute should be applied to these cases. When
the statute is applied, what is applied is a statutory principle or formula,
one evolved in administration. The application involves the judicial creation of a new statutory precept by adjudicative lawmaking, one which
usually parallels or supplements express statutory rules of the statute. At
other times the new statutory precept may even modify express statutory
precepts so that they may operate with respect to conditions developing
for the first time after enactment of the statute.
Let us take one example of the author's proposal in action. We may
begin with the common situation of a statute being administered by a
court or agency through adjudication. This is the case of a statute the
express rules of which do not provide in their words for a given class of
situations. Let us assume there is a complete absence of words dealing
with what to do with the case. On the other hand, if we have regard for
the discernible "statutory principle" dealing with like cases as well as the
purposes bearing upon that principle and the express precepts through
which it is realized, we are provided with a means for handling the case
before the court. It is a situation, moreover, in which we are presented
with more than the availability of a means for handling the particular
case. We are also presented with the alternative that if the particular
case is not handled like the other cases, the statutory principle, unlike
common law and constitutional principles, will not be permitted to operate
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for the cases for which it is most adapted. If giving effect to a common
law or other principle would call for a different result in the case, then
rejection of the applicable statutory law principle by a court involves rejection of the action of a coordinate agency of democratic political society
that has thought about the general problem and has produced the purposes and the principle (in some cases only the material for formulating
a principle) for resolving the controversy. In Kirschwing v. O'Donnell,"'
the Supreme Court of Colorado was faced with precisely the problem
just described.
The charter of the City and County of Denver, Colorado, provided
for policemen's pensions. In a suit by former members of the police department to compel payment of larger pensions it was contended by the
defendant city officials that the charter provisions, properly interpreted,
provided that a policeman retiring at the end of his fortieth year of service should have his pension determined on the basis of his salary and
rank for his twenty-fifth year of service rather than his fortieth. The
charter expressly covered a number of classes of retirement situations.
If a policeman retired at the end of twenty-five years of service, he was
due a pension equal to one-half the average monthly salary received during his twenty-fifth year of service. If salaries of policemen were raised,
pensioners were due an increase in pension equal to one-half of the raise
in pay granted in the rank the pensioner held at retirement. Sick leave
as well as disability leave was provided for an officer at one-half the
salary for the rank held at the time the illness or disability occurred. Payments to widows of officers were provided upon the basis of the salary
of the deceased officer at the time of retirement, death, or disability,
whichever had first occurred. The charter provision, however, did not
speak to the pension of an officer who elected not to retire at the end of
twenty-five years. It simply stated that this election was permitted and
that the extended service would terminate if he became physically or
mentally unfit to perform his duties.
In rejecting the contention of the defendants the Supreme Court of
Colorado referred, inter alia, to the statutory purposes and to the principle for payment of pensions that it could see at work in the several
rules covering the various pension situations other than the one presented
to the court to which the statute did not speak by a rule. All of these
rules made the year in which service was terminated the year determinative of the salary and rank upon which pensions were to be based or
modified. This was the statutory principle at work in these rules. More21.

120 Colo. 125, 207 P.2d 819 (1949).
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over, the various purposes underlying the statute supported application of
the principle at work in other pension situations to the pension situation
presented in the instant case. These purposes included the reward of
efficiency, the encouragement of officers to remain in the service, and
the giving of an assurance that a decent living would be available upon
retirement, whether from disability or other cause. All of these purposes would be disserved if the statutory principle of basing pension on
salary and rank in the last year of service used in other pension situations
were not applied to the case of an officer retiring in his fortieth year.
The total absence of an express rule placed no difficulty in the way of
the court providing a judge-made precept paralleling the express statutory precepts in light of the relevant underlying statutory principle and
the various relevant statutory purposes.
The Supreme Court of Colorado reached the right result in the
Kirschwing case. Not once did it falter in its conception that it was
an administrator of the statute and committed to fidelity to the statute,
its purposes, and its principles. It did not conceive it was limited
in its mandatory administration of the statute to pouring meaning only
into the express rules of the statute. Its function of assigning meaning
was properly conceived as extending to a situation where no rules were
provided. Presumably the court could have stated the legislature had
not provided for this case. In fact it had not, in terms of a rule. Had
the court taken this route it might have declared that since the plaintiff
was not provided with a pension under the statute and since the common
law did not provide principles relating to pensions of employees, he had
no substantive right to assert against the city and county. The court
might instead have analogized the situation to one of a contract between
an employer and an employee providing for the payment of a pension but
failing to specify the amount of the pension in this situation. The court
might then have determined that the principles of contract or quasicontract law demanded that the city respond to the former employee with
a pension at least equal to the highest or other pension provided for in
the express rules, as the measure of the value of the pension due. This
conceivably could have been the pension for the person retiring in his
twenty-fifth year. The point is that a number of ways of dealing with
the controversy between the city and the employee on the matter of the
pension became possible if the court could properly view the statute as
not binding on it because it contained no express rules to which meaning
could be assigned in order to solve the case before it. It is submitted that
the only accurate approach to administration of the statute was the one
utilized by the court. This was one of conceiving that it was bound to
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a faithful administration of the statute in light of relevant legislative
purposes and the statutory principle underlying its express rules. It
properly conceived of its task as one of discovering or formulating principle in light of the legislative purposes and express statutory precepts.
To speak of the court here as being free to use or not to use the technique
of statutory analogy and as operating in the field of common law with
an eye on the city charter merely as a possible source of law is to demote statutory law to an inferior and undeserved rank.
Although the Kirschwing case involves perhaps the simplest situation in which the statutory principle must be judicially isolated or formulated, it contains a profound lesson in judicial administration. A more
complex situation is presented when much more judicial creativity must
be employed in formulating the statutory principle to be utilized in resolving the case before the court. Sometimes this creativity will involve
the application of the principle of one statute in the course of administering a different statute, as in the recent case of Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Civil AeronauticsBoard.22 Here there was an express rule of the statute
available to serve as the vehicle for application of the principle underlying
the so-called Ashbacker doctrine.23 In Keifer and Keifer v. Reconstruc24 the
tion Finance Corporation
statutory principle at work in forty-odd
statutes similar to the one before the court was applied although there
was no express rule of the statute to serve as the vehicle of application.
The Supreme Court of the United States first settled the relevancy of the
statutory principle at work in the other federal statutes to the administration of the statute before it. It said: ".

.

. the circumstances attending

the origination of Regional make it manifest that it was within the considerations that have uniformly led Congress to make its immediate
corporate creatures subject to suit."2 " Having established the relevancy
of the statutory principle for another statutory area, the Court deemed
itself bound to be faithful to that principle. To act otherwise and "to
imply for Regionals a unique legal position compared with those corporations to whose purposes Regional is so closely allied, is to infer Congressional idiosyncrasy"" and to "do violence to Congressional purpose. ' 11'
The same judge who wrote the opinion in Kiefer and Kiefer, however,
faltered when faced with essentially the same problem of utilization of
22. 275 F.2d 632 (D.C. Cir. 1959).
23. Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. Federal Communication Commission, 326 U. S. 327

(1946).
24.

306 U. S. 381 (1939).

25. Id. at 392.
26. Id. at 393.
27. Id. at 395.
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statutory principle in Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc.2" In
this case the problem of judicial creativity was considerably eased by virtue of the legislature having specifically directed the administrator of
the statute to bear the initial and major responsibility for formulating
a statutory principle to guide the administration of the provision in question. The performance of the task of judicial review of administrative
formulation of statutory principle required judicial creativity only to the
extent of calling upon the court to judge the adequacy of the formulation
in light of underlying legislative purposes and analogous provisions of
the statute. Nevertheless, the overall task of administration by agency
and court alike was more extensive than in the Kirschwing, Ashbacker,
and Delta cases since the bulk of the content of the statutory principle
had to be formulated in the course of administration.
In the view of the author, therefore, the court is not an interpreter
whose function is merely to discover the historical meaning of language
used in statutory rules and to apply these rules as so interpreted to individual cases. More accurately the court is engaged in assignment of
meaning to statutes or in making statutes meaningful for administration.
This involves attribution of purpose to statutes and in discovery, or more
accurately, development and evolving of statutory principles in light of
these purposes and relevant administrative standards. Moreover, the
court is engaged in putting these principles and purposes to work. Most
of the time this will involve application either of express rules of a statute
or rules parallel to these developed in the course of prior administration.
It may be seen that a court here is "doing what comes naturally." It
cannot do otherwise and "make sense." It cannot do otherwise and make
the contribution only it or another adjudicative agency can make to administration of law. It cannot do otherwise and at the same time treat
statutory law as having a first class citizenship in the regime of law.
Thus, in administration of statutory law a court in assigning statutory
meaning has many roles. It is an attributer of purpose, a developer of
statutory principle in light of legislative purpose, a judicial lawmaker,
and finally an applier of rules that are kept responsive to statutory principles as necessary by judicial lawmaking.
This new hypothesis gives effect to much of existing practice of our
best courts operating at their best. The concepts it involves of legislative
purpose and statutory principle are realistic and balanced. The new hypothesis gives to courts an important role in development of statutory
policy but in an ordered way that implements and improves on raw ma28. 322 U.S. 607 (1944).
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terials of legislation. It thus perfects institutions of democratic society:
the perfection consists in utilizing the best contribution of its chief lawmakers in making and administration of statutory law. The existing
dichotomy between statutory interpretation and statutory analogy is
largely responsible for the growing decline in prestige of American state
courts in a regime of law becoming increasingly statutory in composition.
The dichotomy is also responsible for the variation in excellence of
product one sees too frequently in the work of federal courts and administrative agencies. When courts and agencies more generally take on
roles envisaged by this new hypothesis, they will be enabled to achieve
the same strength, originality, responsibility and statesmanship that belong to the grand tradition of the common law and to the great periods
of our constitutional law. If common law and constitutional law are
equal to the perennial problems of administration, so is statutory law.
It is, one may well say, a matter of applying statutory principles evolved
judicially in light of relevant legislative purposes and proper administrative considerations.

